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TAKING A PAGE FROM THE FDA’S PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE
INFORMATION RULES: REIMAGINING ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
Rebecca Bratspies and Sarah Lamdan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2017, Hurricanes Harvey and Irma hit the southern United
States in rapid succession. These massive hurricanes wrought widespread
devastationdestroying buildings, flooding neighborhoods, and taking
lives.1 Harvey shattered the national rainfall record for a single storm,
dropping more than fifty inches of rain in thirty-six hours.2 The rest of the
country watched in shock as stranded Houstonians waded through chestdeep floodwaters. Those residents were not merely wading through water;
they were wading through a toxic stew. Those same floodwaters that filled
the streets inundated scores of industrial facilities and at least thirteen of
Houston’s forty-one Superfund sites.3 Floodwater carried contaminants and
fugitive chemicals from those deluged Superfund sites into densely
populated areas of the city. Indeed, hurricane floodwaters notoriously carry
all manner of contaminants, from pesticides and landfill waste to the
contents of inundated chemical waste storage containers.4 The problem is
particularly severe in industry-heavy cities such as Houston, where
floodwater travels from industrial stockyards and production plants through
*

Sarah Lamdan and Rebecca Bratspies are both Professors at CUNY School of Law. They
collaborate through the Center for Urban Environmental Reform.
1. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria were especially intense and long-lasting due to
climate change. Warm seas brought extraordinary amounts of rain that stalled over major
municipalities in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Emily Schuckburgh et al., Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma and Maria: How Natural Were These ‘Natural Disasters’?, 72 WEATHER 353,
353 (2017) (“So in conclusion, it is clear that human activities have raised the risks of various
aspects of hurricane damage.”).
2. Brian Resnick, Harvey Broke a National Rainfall Record for a Single Tropical
Storm, VOX (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:33 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8
/29/16221542/hurricane-harvey-rainfall-record-houston.
3. Status of Superfund Sites in Areas Affected by Harvey, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/status-superfund-sites-areasaffected-harvey (describing sites designated for cleanup under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a federal law that
tasks polluters with paying to clean up the sites they pollute).
4. Alexandra Sifferlin, Here’s How Dirty Flood Water Really Is, TIME (Aug. 29, 2017,
10:14 AM), http://time.com/4919355/can-flood-water-make-you-sick/ (describing the
network of waterways that exacerbate Houston’s floods).
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the bayous, channels, and temporary waterways, leaving toxic water and
other chemical hazards in its wake.5
The Texan first responders dispatched to the flooded Arkema chemical
plant in Crosby, Texas found this out first-hand. The Arkema plant
manufactures organic peroxides used in plastics and rubbers.6 During
Hurricane Harvey, water flooded the plant’s backup generators, cutting off
power to the refrigeration system that kept the plant’s chemicals at a safe,
non-flammable temperature.7 Without refrigeration, the chemicals exploded,
sending forty-foot plumes of toxic chemicals into the air and floodwaters.8
First responders rushing to deal with the crisis faced thick, toxic fumes.9
Unfortunately, those first responders were not armed with critical
knowledge about the likely composition of those fumes.10 Many collapsed.11
Police officers and medical personnel were “doubled over vomiting, unable
to breathe.”12
Deliberate choices to hide chemical hazard data sent these first
responders into harm’s way unprepared.13 In 2014, flouting national disaster
preparedness laws Texas’s then-Attorney General, Greg Abbott,14 restricted
access to Arkema’s chemical records citing potential “terroristic
activities.”15 This decision made the records detailing the toxic chemicals
5. Tom Dart, ‘The Bayou’s Alive’: Ignoring It Could Kill Houston, GUARDIAN (Dec.
20, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/20/bayou-houston-floodhurricane-harvey-texas-resilience; Darryl Fears & Brady Dennis, Harvey’s Flooding Spurs
Concerns About Houston’s Toxic Waste Sites, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/29/houstons-flood-threatens-turn-polluted-superfundsites-toxic-gumbo/.
6. Shelby Lin Erdman, What Is the Arkema Plant and What Do They Make?, ATLANTA
J. CONST. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/weather/hurricanes/what-the-arkema-plantand-what-they-make/M28F4CrhRY9hk0JdRffuhJ/.
7. Ari Natter & Laura Brubaker Calkins, Harvey Responders Say They Were Sickened
by Chemical Plant Blaze, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.journalnow.com
/news/nation_world/harvey-responders-say-they-were-sickened-by-chemical-plantblaze/article_e28bc1aa-33dc-5e30-ba58-026545104cb3.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7.
14. Greg Abbott was elected governor of Texas in 2014, and he was overwhelmingly reelected in November 2018. Brett Samuels, Texas Governor Greg Abbott Wins Reelection,
HILL (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:10 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/414274-texasgovernor-wins-re-election.
15. Emma Platoff & Jim Malewitz, Crosby Plant Explosion Highlights State Efforts to
Block Access to Chemical Information, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www
.texastribune.org/2017/09/01/crosby-plant-explosion-highlights-state-efforts-limit-accessinformati/.
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stored and used in the Arkema plant almost impossible to access. As a
result, the Arkema first responders were hampered by a lack of knowledge
about the hazards they faced as they struggled to contain dangerous
chemical fires.16
The Arkema disaster highlights the importance of access to chemical
data when natural disasters strike. Lack of information put the Arkema first
responders in jeopardy.17 Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident.18
Hazardous chemical releases have injured thousands of people across the
country.19 An explosion at the Bayer Crop Science plant in Institute, West
Virginia killed two employees and injured eight others,20 and a pipe failure
at a Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California sent 15,000 people to the
hospital.21 Overall, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB), which investigates chemical accidents to protect workers, has
responded to more than 800 chemical release incidents since 1998.22 As
climate change-supercharged natural disasters threaten industrial
infrastructure with high winds, flood waters, intense heat, wildfire, and
mudslides, chemical hazards are far more likely. 23 Ordinary safety
mechanisms often fail in extraordinary weather conditions.24 Temperature
and pressure controls that prevent chemical explosions, as well as structures

16. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., id.
18. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT:
PESTICIDE CHEMICAL RUNAWAY REACTION PRESSURE VESSEL EXPLOSION 1 (2011), https://
www.csb.gov/bayer-cropscience-pesticide-waste-tank-explosion/ (follow “FINAL REPORT:
Bayer CropScience” hyperlink).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL., IMPROVING PUBLIC AND WORKER SAFETY AT OIL
REFINERIES 4 (2014), http://www.caloes.ca.gov/FireRescueSite/Documents/Refinery%20Rpt
%20Feb%202014.pdf.
22. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., https://www.csb.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2018).
23. Adam B. Smith, 2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: A
Historic Year in Context, CLIMATE (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/blogs
/beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historicyear (discussing and providing statistics demonstrating the increasing climate and weather
events).
24. The Arkema plant is a prime example of this issue. Upon investigation, the CSB
found that there were no design flaws in the plant that caused the chemical breakdown and
explosions, but the site’s hurricane plan only prepared for up to two feet of flooding, rather
than the four feet that flooded the plant during Hurricane Harvey. Jen Para, Report: Arkema
Crosby Plant Warned of Flood Risk Before Harvey, HOUS. BUS. J. (May 24, 2018, 2:10 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2018/05/24/report-arkema-crosby-plant-warnedof-flood-risk.html.
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such as retaining walls and containers, are often not built to withstand
extreme weather.25
One clear lesson that emerged from the post-mortem analysis of
emergency response during Hurricane Katrina was that arming the public
and first responders with adequate risk information is an imperative of
effective emergency preparation and response.26 Indeed, information access
is a cornerstone of effective chemical disaster preparation.27 When
hurricanes, mudslides, and wildfires rip through cities and towns,
information about the chemical hazards lurking in water-inundated storage
facilities, broken refrigeration units, and plants with crippled infrastructures
becomes critical to protecting human health and safety.28 The more people
know about the risks at hand, the more efficiently localities and individuals
can react to chemical hazards. For this reason, disaster preparation laws,
such as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA) and the Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Program (RMP),
contain information access provisions designed to prepare first responders
and communities for chemical catastrophes.29
Yet, federal, state, and local governments too often fail to ensure that
first responders, localities, and individuals have the information they need to
prepare for chemical disasters. Policies designed to protect trade secrets and
react to national security issues sometimes curb information access.30 Since
September 11, 2001, information about chemical hazards in the U.S. has
been increasingly difficult to access.31 Commercial and national security
interests have undercut information access requirements enshrined in
EPCRA and the RMP.32 What’s more, those information access
requirements have not been properly maintained and enforced.33

25. Id.
26. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 61–62 (2006) (discussing the more than 2,000 cases of pollution reported
in the wake of the hurricane and concluding that better information access would have led to
better preparation and response to the environmental threats caused by the hurricane),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.
27. Nitesh Bharosa et al., Challenges and Obstacles in Sharing and Coordinating
Information During Multi-Agency Disaster Response: Propositions from Field Exercises, 12
INFO. SYSTEMS FRONTIERS 49, 4950 (2010) (“Access to core information enhances the
efficiency and effectiveness of [disaster] responses as well as coordination throughout the
network of responding organizations.”).
28. Id.
29. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 301, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1100150 (2014); Clean Air Act Risk Management Program, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2018).
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part III.
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As we contend with natural disasters exacerbated by climate change,
we will need to redesign critical infrastructure to protect vulnerable
communities. We must also ensure that those communities have access to
the critical information they need for emergency preparedness and
emergency response. That means redesigning our intangible information
infrastructure as well.
This article proposes a partial solution to this information access crisis.
It begins with an analysis of the increased chemical disaster risks posed by
climate change-related extreme weather.34 After laying this foundation about
the relationship between chemical disaster risk and climate change, Part III
provides an overview of the current state of federal law governing disclosure
of chemical disaster risks.35 Part IV identifies the key concerns that have
been deployed by those bent on thwarting or reducing public access to
chemical risk information: national security and confidential business
information.36 This section makes the case that EPCRA and the RMP, even
if fully enforced, fail to equip communities adequately for the unique
challenges posed by disaster-related chemical releases.37 Part V of the paper
suggests using the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) information
access model to inform the public about chemical hazards that pose risks in
extreme weather events.38 The FDA has successfully created a system to
notify the public about drug safety issues while protecting trade secrets. A
chemical hazard notification system modeled on the FDA paradigm could
similarly inform the public while preserving sensitive trade and national
security information.39
To prevent jeopardizing health and safety in the wake of a natural
disaster, people need quick and easy access to information about potential
chemical risks.40 In regulating drug and medical device risks, the FDA has
perfected modes for streamlined, easy-to-understand risk communication,
using tools such as labels and inserts.41 This article proposes it as a model

34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See infra Part III.
41. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2018) (describing how prescription drug labels must be
formatted, and what they must contain). FDA administrators identify several synonyms used
for drug labels that also include several different forms of labeling, including: prescribing
information, package insert, professional labeling, direction circular, and package circular.
Mary E. Kremzner & Steven F. Osborne, An Introduction to the Improved FDA Prescription
Drug Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training/
forhealth professionals/ucm090796.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
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that could fruitfully be adapted to more effectively communicate chemical
risk information.42
II. THE INCREASED RISKS OF EXTREME WEATHER POSED BY CLIMATE
CHANGE
The 2017 hurricane season was intense and relentless. Seventeen
named storms and ten hurricanes, six of them major,43 formed in the seventh
most active hurricane season in the historical record dating to 1851.44 Seven
storms hit the United States, and three of them caused devastating damage.45
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) called the
2017 hurricane season “Extremely Active” and the NOAA administrator
called it “a hurricane season that wouldn’t quit.”46 These storms made the
2017 hurricane season the most expensive in U.S. history, causing more
than $200 billion of damage across the nation.47 The devastation caused by
the hurricanes was greater than in past storms because of the especially
powerful winds and intense rainfall, which scientists blamed on warmer
ocean waters.48 While the number of weather disasters in 2017 was extreme,
it was part of a trend. The frequency of weather-related disasters has
increased forty-six percent since 2000.49 Between 2005 and 2014, climaterelated disasters cost $309 billion in G-20 countries alone.50
Scientists predict that, as climate change progresses, weather events
once thought of as extreme, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and
42. See infra Part VI.
43. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) defines a “major
hurricane” as one that reaches maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of at least 50 m/s
(96 kt, 111 mph). Thus, a major hurricane would rank as a 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson
scale. Frequently Asked Questions, What is a major hurricane?, NOAA, HURRICANE RES.
DIVISION, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A3.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
44. Extremely Active 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Finally Ends, NOAA (Nov. 30,
2017), http://www.noaa.gov/media-release/extremely-active-2017-atlantic-hurricane-seasonfinally-ends.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Willie Drye, 2017 Hurricane Season Was the Most Expensive in U.S. History, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/2017-hurricaneseason-most-expensive-us-history-spd/.
48. Frequently Asked Questions, How might global warming change hurricane intensity,
frequency, and rainfall?, NOAA, HURRICANE RES. DIVISION, http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd
/tcfaq/G3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
49. Nick Watts et al., The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change: From 25
Years of Inaction to a Global Transformation for Public Health, 391 LANCET 581, 581
(2017).
50. Elena Holodny, Extreme Weather Events Are on the Rise, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23,
2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/extreme-weather-events-increasing2016-3.
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Maria, will become more common.51 Houston, for example, has weathered
three 500-year storms in the past three years.52 This trend is expected to
continue.53 All evidence suggests that as the climate changes, severe storms
will be larger and longer-lasting, forest fires will be more frequent, and
high-impact weather-related events such as droughts and heat waves will be
more common and severer.54
Because extreme weather events dramatically increase the chances of
structural or operational failures at industrial sites, they make chemical
disasters far more likely.55 The chemical disasters sparked by Hurricane
Harvey are a foretaste of what we can expect going forward.56 More than
forty industrial sites, including refineries and plastics plants, released
dangerous amounts of hazardous pollutants into the air after Hurricane
Harvey.57 Air emissions exceeded state limits while at least fourteen toxic
waste sites experienced flooding or damage, releasing hazardous
chemicals.58 The flooded sites included the San Jacinto River Waste Pits, a
Superfund site that contains carcinogenic paper mill waste.59 The deluge of
rain from Harvey damaged the Waste Pits protective cap designed to contain
the waste, spreading dioxins and other toxic chemicals far and wide.60 After

51. See generally James P. Kossin et al., Extreme Storms, in CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL
REPORT: A SUSTAINED ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY OF THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, 375 (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017), https://assets.documentcloud
.org/documents/3920195/Final-Draft-of-the-Climate-Science-Special-Report.pdf.
52. Christopher Ingraham, Houston Is Experiencing Its Third ‘500 Year’ Flood in Three
Years. How Is That Possible?, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 29, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/29/houston-is-experiencing-its-third-500year-flood-in-3-years-how-is-that-possible/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.64 aaba2522a1.
53. See Kossin et al., supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Nushin Huq, Chemical Plants Face New Reality in Natural Disaster Preparation,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-andenergy/chemical-plants-face-new-reality-in-natural-disaster-preparation.
56. Hiroko Tabuchi et al., Floods Are Getting Worse, and 2,500 Chemical Sites Lie in
the Water’s Path, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018
/02/06/climate/flood-toxic-chemicals.html.
57. Troy Griggs et al., More Than 40 Sites Released Hazardous Pollutants Because of
Hurricane Harvey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/09/08/us/houston-hurricane-harvey-harzardous-chemicals.html.
58. Id.
59. Lise Olsen & Brooke A. Lewis, EPA: Dioxin Leaking from Waste Pits, HOUS.
CHRON. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/Houston
/article/EPA-Dioxin-leaking-from-Waste-Pits-12242409.php.
60. Jack Healy & Sheila Kaplan, Harvey Swept Hazardous Mercury Ashore. The
Mystery: Its Source, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06
/science /harvey-superfund-mercury.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fscience;
San Jacinto River Waste Pits Superfund Site, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www
.epa.gov/tx/sjrwp (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
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experiencing damage from the hurricane, Houston’s Valero Energy refinery
released dangerous levels of the carcinogen benzene into the air.61
The problem of toxic chemical releases in the wake of natural disasters
is not unique to Hurricane Harvey. For instance, in 2012, Hurricane Sandy
hit 247 Superfund sites, and one of them, the Gowanus Canal, overflowed
into people’s homes.62 Similarly, scientists found toxic chemicals in the soil
and groundwater affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.63
Adequate preparation for a future of extreme weather events requires
more and better preparation for industrial disasters. This need is
compounded as the nation’s infrastructure ages, and repairs and upgrades
are repeatedly postponed.64 First responders and the public at large must be
able to anticipate the health and safety hazards posed by local industrial sites
associated with natural disasters.65 Laws such as EPCRA and the RMP are
meant to generate information about potential air emission risks posed by
local industries and make that information available to first responders and
the public.66 However, these laws are designed to aggregate general
information about industrial plants, and are not specifically tailored to the
enhanced risks created by extreme weather risks associated with climate
change.67 Both laws suffer procedural and logistical deficiencies that leave
61. Hiroko Tabuchi, High Levels of Carcinogen Found in Houston Area After Harvey,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/us/harvey-houston-valerobenzene.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.
62. Emily Atkin, America Has a Toxic Waste Hurricane Problem, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept.
8, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144737/america-toxic-waste-hurricane-problem.
63. Id.
64. Eric Jaffe, America’s Infrastructure Crisis Is Really a Maintenance Crisis, CITYLAB
(Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/02/americas-infrastructure-crisis-isreally-a-maintenance-crisis/385452/.
65. Looking at collections of CSB’s incident reports reveals that many chemical
disasters in the U.S. are caused in whole or in part by outdated, outmoded, and overburdened
industrial infrastructure. See CSB Issues Case Study of Formosa Plastics Point Comfort,
Texas, Fire and Explosions: Unprotected Piping, Non-Fire-proofed Structures, Lack of
Automatic Shutoff Valves Noted as Causes; Flame-Resistant Clothing Recommend, U.S.
CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD. (July 20, 2006), http://www.csb.gov/csbissues-case-study-of-formosa-plastics-point-comfort-texas-fire-and-explosions-unprotectedpiping-non-fireproofed-structures-lack-of-automatic-shutoff-valves-noted-as-causes-flameresistant-clothing-recommended/; U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD.,
INVESTIGATION REPORT: REFINERY FIRE AND EXPLOSION (2007), https://www.csb.gov/bpamerica-refinery-explosion/ (follow “FINAL REPORT: Final Investigation Report”
hyperlink); see also Griggs et al., supra note 57 (noting that many of the plants overcome by
Hurricane Harvey have spotty safety records and noted safety issues).
66. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESOURCES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRST
RESPONDERS (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/epa-cfats-lawenforcement-first-responder-resources-fs-508.pdf.
67. Congress enacted EPCRA enacted in 1986 in order to increase public knowledge
and access to information on the chemicals at individual facilities, as well as to inform the
public about chemical uses and potential releases into the environment. U.S. ENVTL.
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the public and first responders ill-equipped to respond to post-natural
disaster chemical catastrophes.
III. EPCRA & RMP: THE CURRENT CHEMICAL RISK INFORMATION REGIME
Information access provisions are codified in most environmental laws
and programs as well as other federal and state health and safety provisions.
Provisions such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) oil
pollution prevention regulations,68 the U.S. Department of Transportation’s
Pipeline Response Plan regulation,69 and the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) chemical facility anti-terrorism standards,70 regulate the
collection of chemical hazard data. However, only two major provisions,
EPCRA and RMP, are specifically designed to prepare the public for
chemical disasters.71 Just as housing codes are “written in blood”72 these
emergency disaster laws were reactions to past emergency preparedness
failures. Specifically, EPCRA and RMP emerged in response to two Union
Carbide chemical disasters: one in Bhopal, India and another in Institute,
West Virginia.73 In 1984, faulty operations at a Union Carbide pesticide

PROTECTION AGENCY, THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT 1
(2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/epcra_fact_sheet
_overview_8-2-17.pdf . See infra notes 57−61 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
catastrophe that prompted this law.
68. EPA Oil Pollution Prevention, 40 C.F.R. § 112.7 (2016).
69. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration Pipeline Safety, 49 C.F.R. §§ 190–99 (2017).
70. DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 6 C.F.R. § 27 (2007).
71. Although both the Clean Air Act’s RMP and EPCRA have information reporting
and dissemination requirements, EPCRA’s are distinct from those in the Clean Air Act. The
hazardous chemical reporting requirements under EPCRA differ from the Clean Air Act.
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 370 (2018), with id. § 68. EPCRA hazardous chemical inventory
reporting (on Program 1 or Program 2 forms) applies to all hazardous chemicals, as defined
by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), with certain exemptions. Id. §
370.13. Information reported under the hazardous chemical inventory regulations includes the
types and amounts of hazardous chemicals, location and storage information, and facility
contact information. The Clean Air Act’s RMP applies to a distinct set of regulated
substances. Id. § 68.130. The RMP requirements go beyond emergency planning and
reporting; they require a holistic approach to accident prevention and mitigation. Elements
required under the RMP regulations vary for individual stationary sources, but generally
include a hazard assessment, a prevention program, an emergency response program, and a
management system. Id. § 68. There is also the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard
(PSM), but it focuses on providing information for accident prevention to workers, not the
general public, so it will not be a focus in this article. Id. § 68(D).
72. See, e.g., Daniel Byrne, After 100 Years: The Lessons to Be Learned from Triangle
Shirtwaist, FIREHOUSE (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.firehouse.com/prevention-investigation
/article/10463244/triangle-shirtwaist-fire-lessons-in-fire-codes-and-prevention.
73. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India led to a massive explosion.74 More
than half a million people were exposed to toxic airborne chemicals, tens of
thousands died or suffered severe injuries.75 Less than a year later, a storage
tank exploded at another Union Carbide plant, this one in Institute, West
Virginia.76 The resulting toxic cloud injured scores of nearby residents.77
Residents in both Bhopal and Institute were caught unaware and
unprepared.78 First responders faced added dangers because they lacked
knowledge about the chemical substances at issue, and thus could not take
appropriate protective measures.79 Doctors treating the injured had no idea
what symptoms to expect, or what treatments would be effective. 80 These
chemical disasters became human disasters, and lack of information
magnified the harms.81
In November 1986, less than two years after the Bhopal disaster,
Congress enacted EPCRA to respond to the need for accurate, timely
information about chemical risks.82 The RMP Rule was promulgated to
implement 112(r) of the Clean Air Act several years later, in 1990.83 Both
statutes included sweeping public information access provisions. Through
these provisions, EPCRA and RMP sought to transform industrial chemical
practices “from a secretive alchemy to a publicly posted overload of papers,
training materials and neighborhood emergency maps.”84 The resulting
statutory and regulatory schemes provided for information disclosure to
make public the chemical hazard data needed to improve awareness,
planning, and preparation for potential disasters.

74. Tim Edwards, What Happened, THE BHOPAL MED. APPEAL, http://bhopal.org/whathappened/ (last visited May 9, 2017).
75. Id.
76. Ben A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks at Carbide Plant in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plantin-west-virginia.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.; Edwards, supra note 74.
79. Edwards, supra note 74.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also, H.R. REP. NO.
99962, at 28081 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3374.
83. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7), 61 Fed. Reg. 31668 (June 20, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68).
84. James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil:” Should
Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 559, 563 (2002).
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EPCRA

EPCRA was a 1986 amendment to the Comprehensive Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (commonly known as “Superfund”). 85 It
was introduced as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA).86 EPCRA governs local and state emergency planning for
potential disasters involving hazardous chemicals, the right of the public to
access information on chemical hazards in their community, and the
reporting responsibilities for facilities that use, store, and release hazardous
chemicals.87 The law has four major provisions: emergency planning
obligations;88 emergency release notifications;89 reporting requirements for
hazardous chemical storage;90 and the creation of a toxic chemical release
inventory.91
These provisions are markedly different from more traditional
“command and control”, “end of pipe” governance that limit hazardous
discharge. Instead, EPCRA uses regulation to proactively promote chemical
disaster awareness and preparation.92 The theory behind EPCRA is that
public access to data helps communities make informed decisions about the
chemical hazards in their midst. The law prioritizes public participation
(hence the “right-to-know” language in its title).93 Indeed, EPCRA is the
only U.S. environmental law that arguably creates a stand-alone right of
environmental information access.94
EPCRA mandates the public availability of two major types of
information: (1) emergency plans and (2) information about toxic releases.95
While that sweep might be broad, the law’s focus is fairly narrow. EPCRA
85. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99499.
86. Id.
87. Kevin J. Finto, Regulation by Information Through EPCRA, 4 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 13 (1990).
88. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act §§ 301–303.
89. Id. § 304.
90. Id. §§ 311–312.
91. Id. § 313.
92. Matthew J. Smith, “Thou Shalt Not Violate!”: Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act Authorizes Citizen Suits for Wholly Past Violations – Atlantic States Legal
Foundation v. Whiting Roll Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1051,
1075 (1993).
93. At the state and local levels, stakeholders help make EPCRA-required chemical
emergency plans. Local Emergency Planning Committees, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (last visited Nov.
12, 2018).
94. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 301, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1100150 (2014).
95. SARAH LAMDAN, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: RESEARCH, ACCESS, &
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 88 (2017).

584

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

mandates access to information that is likely to help reduce acute health
effects from short-term exposure to chemical releases. In other words,
EPCRA covers precisely the type of information that is key to ensuring the
safety of civilians and first responders facing hurricanes, wildfires, flooding
and other climate change-related weather events.
The most well-known information access provision in EPCRA is the
one that requires the EPA to create and maintain an inventory of toxic
chemicals, or Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).96 The TRI has been credited
with reducing chemical emissions in the United States by twenty-one
percent since 2006.97 While these reductions are highly significant, the TRI
has also produced a less concrete but equally important outcome in the
context of information policy, “serv[ing] as a constant example of the vital
role information plays in a democracy, and the importance of the public’s
right to know.”98
Beyond the TRI, which reports on past releases, EPCRA also helps
communities plan for future emissions by providing information to the
public through Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).99 LEPCs
are composed of local participants including elected officials; police, fire,
civil defense, and public health professionals; environmental, transportation,
and hospital officials; facility representatives; members of the media; and
community groups who develop and review local emergency response plans
and disseminate disaster preparation information to the public.100 LEPC
emergency response plans generally contain information such as:
identification of facilities and transportation routes for extremely hazardous
substances; description of on-site and off-site emergency response
procedures; emergency notification procedures; predictions about areas and
populations that may be affected by a hazardous substances event and
evacuation plans; description of local emergency equipment and facilities
and the persons responsible for them; training programs for emergency
responders; and methods and schedules for exercising emergency response
plans.101 Ideally, LEPCs are hubs for chemical hazard information. If
properly maintained and operated, LEPCs provide information about local

96. 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
97. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI) NATIONAL ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents
/2016_tri_national_analysis_execsumm.pdf.
98. OMB WATCH, DISMANTLING THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY’S SYSTEMATIC WEAKENING OF THE TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (2005),
research.policyarchive.org/5087.pdf.
99. Local Emergency Planning Committees, supra note 93.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 11001(a).
101. Local Emergency Planning Committees, supra note 93.
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chemical hazards for people wanting to learn more about how they can
prepare for chemical disasters nearby.
State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) oversee LEPCs.102
SERC members are designated by state governors, and SERCs coordinate
LEPC activities, including establishing procedures for how LEPCs receive
and process public requests for information collected and created under
EPCRA.103 SERC members usually include emergency management experts
and administrators, as well as firefighting and water quality experts.104
B.

Clean Air Act’s Risk Management Plans

EPCRA is not the only federal statute dealing with public access to
environmental information. Section 7412(r) of the Clean Air Act required
the EPA to draft regulations and guidance to prevent chemical accidents at
facilities that use, distribute, and process hazardous chemicals that pose the
greatest risk of harm in accidental airborne releases of toxic or flammable
gas.105 These statutory requirements were added to the Clean Air Act in
1990.106 It took the EPA nearly a decade to create a risk management plan
program and to finalize the implementing regulations. In 1999, the EPA
finally published the Risk Management Plan regulations under Section
112(r).107 The RMP was designed to help local citizens and emergency
response personnel plan for chemical accidents.108
The EPA created three RMP programs for RMP reporting facilities.109
These tiers “progressively gain granularity and rigor” to address the
particular scales of risks and needs at different facilities.110 Program 1
applies a limited set of requirements to facilities perceived to pose less risk
(typically those facilities with processes unlikely to affect the public even in
the worst case chemical release scenario, and that have not had a major
accident in the last five years).111 On the other end of the spectrum, Program
102. 42 U.S.C. § 11044.
103. Id.
104. State Emergency Response Commissions Contacts, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/state-emergency-response-commissions-contacts (last
visited Jan. 19, 2017).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2014).
106. Id.
107. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 112(r): ACCIDENTAL RELEASE
PREVENTION / RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN RULE (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production
/files/2013-10/documents/caa112_rmp_factsheet.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595 (proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
68).
111. 40 C.F.R. § 68.10(b); id. § 68.12.
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3 applies to facilities that are subject to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard or
classified in an especially hazardous North American Industrial
Classification System code.112 These facilities pose a greater risk to the
public in chemical emergencies. Program 3 requirements include more
extensive procedures and reviews for operating equipment, management,
employees, and contractors.113 Program 2 facilities are in the middle—
neither eligible for Program 1 status nor falling under one of the Program 3
categories. These facilities are subject to more robust requirements than
Program 1, but less than those applied to Program 3.114
Under the finalized RMP regulations, 15,000 facilities were subject to
RMP requirements, which include the creation of hazard assessments that
detail the potential effects of accidental releases, accident summaries, and
evaluations of worst-case and alternative accidental release scenarios called
“offsite consequence analysis” (OCA).115 By 2008, the EPA collected risk
management plans from about 14,000 facilities.116
These plans are supposed to be accessible to the public.117 They are
held at federal reading rooms located throughout the fifty states, and may
also be available through local LEPC offices.118 The EPA website also
suggests that interested individuals may file Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests to see RMP materials.119 As another access point, the EPA
112. Id. § 68(D).
113. Id. Processes that are subject to OSHA’s Process Safety Management standards or
that fall under certain NAICS codes. These processes include especially hazardous industries
such as petroleum refineries, petrochemical and chlorine manufacturing, and pesticide
manufacturing. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
GUIDANCE 13 (2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/chap02-final.pdf.
114. 40 C.F.R. § 68(C).
115. Id. § 68.25–.33.
116. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 107.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c).
118. However, after 9/11, this access was curbed in the interest of national security.
Jessica Barkas, Nuking Freedom of Information and Community Right to Know: How Post9/11 Secrecy Could Make America Less Safe, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POLICY J. 199, 207
(2005). Now, OCAs are generally only available in state reading rooms. 40 C.F.R. § 1400.3.
The EPA was creating a system to balance national security interests with public access that
would require facility owners and operators to notify the public that certain information is
available upon request. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (proposed Mar. 14, 2016). However,
this measure has been put on hold by the Trump administration. 82 Fed. Reg. 27133 (June 14,
2017).
119. Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request Process to Get Information
About Risk Management Plans, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
rmp/using-freedom-information-act-foia-request-process-get-information-about-riskmanagement-plans (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
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has also created an e-mail system for seeing whether someone is in a
“vulnerable zone” that could be affected by a chemical accident, according
to an RMP submitted to the agency.120 However, this e-mail system does not
seem significantly different than the general FOIA process, requiring
requesters to fill out an online form and then wait for an e-mail response
containing the applicable records, with no guarantee on the timing or
completeness of the agency’s response.121
Although these laws were drafted to prevent chemical disaster-related
injuries, natural disasters pose a specialized type of chemical disaster threat.
After major storms and natural disasters, communities must deal with a
laundry list of competing health and safety issues. Rapid access to
information about chemical storage and use during this period is vital for
protecting the health and safety of entire communities. Comprehensive and
effective disclosure is vital to keep the public and first responders informed
during disaster-related emergencies. Chemical hazard disclosure laws need
to adapt to meet the reality that climate-related disasters are on the rise.
IV. INFORMATION ACCESS BREAKDOWNS: PROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT
ACCESS SYSTEMS
Despite their gaps and flaws, EPCRA and the RMP could form the
foundation of a well-crafted information disclosure system. Unfortunately,
both programs are plagued with implementation issues on local, state, and
federal levels. EPCRA and RMP-mandated programs are typically low
priorities, thinly staffed with small budgets.122 Violations often go
120. Vulnerable Zone Indicator System, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/vulnerable-zone-indicator-system (last visited Jan. 19, 2017)
(accessible plans based on specific site locations).
121. Id.
122. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SPECIAL REPORT:
RISK MANAGEMENT PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: WHAT IT MEANS FOR FIRE
SERVICE PLANNING 10−11 (2003), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr124.pdf (describing LEPCs and first responder organizations as generally understaffed and
underfunded, with many volunteers doing the bulk of the work). Many state LEPCs are
underfunded and understaffed, comprised of mostly volunteers. See, e.g., Erica M. Matheny,
A Survey of the Structural Determinants of Local Emergency Planning Committee
Compliance and Proactivity; Toward an Applied Theory of Precaution in Emergency
Management, ETD ARCHIVE 88−90, 112−113 (2012), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=etdarchive (documenting this phenomenon
in Ohio); Rosemary O’Leary, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act:
Ten Public Management Challenges for State and Local Governments, PUB. PRODUCTIVITY &
MGMT. REV. 293, 300−01 (1995) (identifying funding as a key hurdle for implementation);
Danielle M. Purifoy, EPCRA: A Retrospective on the Environmental Right-to-Know Act, 13
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 375, 399, 410 (2013) (documenting lack of funding in
West Virginia).
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unchecked, and fines for noncompliance are light and sparsely enforced.
Worse, many states actively restrict access to the chemical data that EPCRA
was designed to make public, citing fears about unintended uses of the
information to promote terrorism or interfere with trade secrets.123
The Harvey first responders sickened at Arkema were put in jeopardy
by precisely these failures in the information infrastructure.124 Texas’s thenAttorney General, Greg Abbott used national security concerns as a
justification for limiting the availability of EPCRA Program 2 inventories. 125
This failure to properly implement EPCRA and RMP provisions left first
responders unprepared for the toxic chemical exposure they faced. This
unfortunate situation recurs with some regularity.126 Reports issued by the
CSB in the wake of disasters are replete with instances of first responders
suffering illnesses and burns while responding to industrial accidents
because they did not have the necessary information to adequately prepare
for chemical hazards.127 Similarly, 9/11 first responders also suffered from
exposure to a toxic dust filled with thousands of contaminants including
cement dust, lead, and mercury.128 A significant percentage of those
responders have fallen ill or died.129
It is not just first responders who are at risk. Despite the information
access provisions in EPCRA and the Clean Air Act, residents often do not
know about impending chemical disasters until they see chemical clouds or

123. Section 322 of EPCRA allows a facility to withhold the specific chemical identity
information of an extremely hazardous substance from its EPRCA reporting if the facility
asserts a trade secret for that chemical identity. 40 Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 322, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100150 (2018).
124. Natter & Calkins, supra note 7.
125. Lauren McGaughy, State Blocks Release of Chemical Facility Information, HOUS.
CHRON. (June 13, 2014, 8:05 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics
/texas/article/State-blocks-release-of-chemical-facility-5551690.php (describing Abbott’s
decision to treat Tier II reports as classified).
126. Settlement Reached in West, Texas, Fertilizer Plant Explosion, INS. J. (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2018/01/17/477424.htm.
127. Id.
128. Morton Lippmann et al., Health Effects of World Trade Center (WTC) Dust: An
Unprecedented Disaster with Inadequate Risk Management, 45 CRITICAL REVS. IN
TOXICOLOGY 492 (2015); Julian Gavaghan, Still Dying from 9/11: Toxic Legacy of World
Trade Center Attack Revealed as Dust Increases Risk of Cancer by a Fifth, DAILY MAIL
(Sept. 2, 2011, 8:45 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2032893/Firefightersattended-9-11-scene-19-likely-develop-cancer.html; Leah McGrath Goodman, 9/11’s Second
Wave: Cancer and Other Diseases Linked to the 2001 Attacks Are Surging, NEWSWEEK,
(Sept. 7, 2016, 6:40 AM)
https://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/16/9-11-death-toll-rising-496214.html.
129. NEVER FORGET PROJECT, STATISTICS FROM 9/11 AND 15 YEARS LATER, http://
neverforgetproject.com/statistics/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
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smell chemical odors after leaks and spills have already occurred.130 By
then, it is often too late to adequately prepare for chemical exposure risks. In
its chemical incident reviews, the CSB has documented communities
unaware of chemical hazards or what to do when chemical leaks occur,
despite the presence of RMPs.131 For instance, when there was a chemical
explosion at a Chevron refinery in Richmond, California in 2012, people in
surrounding communities saw black clouds, but they did not know what to
do when they heard sirens.132 Unaware that they were supposed to shelter-inplace, citizens panicked as a thick plume of black smoke blacked out the
sun.133 A lack of chemical disaster preparation left the public unprepared,
and media sources did not have the information they needed to warn the
public or publicize appropriate precautions.134 These types of failures
demonstrate the ways that EPCRA and the RMP program fail to adequately
prepare the public for chemical disasters. As one of its last acts, the Obama
EPA took measures to close some of these chemical disaster preparedness
gaps in the RMP.135 The new rules would have strengthened incidence
reporting,136 expanded disaster planning,137 required third-party audits,138
imposed more stringent hazard definitions,139 and improved transparency.140
Unfortunately, the Trump administration suspended these measures,141
probably indefinitely, at the behest of chemical manufacturers.142
130. Anndee Hochman, Union Carbide Has Leak at 2nd Plant, WASH. POST (Aug. 14,
1985), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/08/14/union-carbide-has-leakat-2nd-plant/386a6c54-f2d4-4b23-928e-84f0f50a4fbb/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
96fd334b733a.
131. In the Arkema explosion, the plant submitted a risk management plan containing
worst-case scenarios, but the plan did not account for the events that occurred on August 31,
2017, in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. Emma Platoff, As Lawsuits Over Texas Chemical
Disaster Add Up, Advocates Blame Arkema and Rules Regulating It, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 30,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/03/30/arkema-disaster-harveyregulations-texas-crosby/.
132. See generally Michael Brune, Shelter in Place, SIERRA CLUB: COMING CLEAN BLOG
(Aug. 9, 2012) http://sierraclub.typepad.com/michaelbrune/2012/08/richmond-oil-refineryfire.html.
133. Id.
134. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL., supra note 21, at 22.
135. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595 (proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
68).
136. Id. at 4609.
137. Id. at 4608.
138. Id. at 4609–18.
139. Id. at 4696.
140. Id. at 4596.
141. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 27133 (proposed June 14, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68) (delaying the effective date for 20 months, until February 19, 2019, to provide time to
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Easy access to information about toxic chemical sites is especially
important in the aftermath of hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and other natural
disasters. In weather disasters, people are often left to make health and
safety decisions on their own, without the ability to coordinate with
neighbors and emergency responders when the normal routes of
communication such as internet access and electric-powered devices fail.143
History has shown that when people do not know about nearby chemical
hazards, they are far more likely to be injured by chemical releases.144 Even
as climate change increases the number and severity of severe weather
events, local, state, and federal authorities continue to weaken EPCRA and
RMP provisions because of concerns about unintended use and practical
failures. The impending challenges of climate change and supercharged
natural disasters require local, state, and federal governments to overcome
regulatory and practical obstacles to create a better system for chemical
hazard information access and dissemination.
A.

Regulatory Obstacles: Overreaction to the Threat of Unintended Use

A common concern about sharing chemical risk information is that the
information will be misused.145 Unintended use is the main rationale for
curbing access to EPCRA and RMP chemical safety and disaster preparation
information. There are two main types of unintended use: terrorism and
corporate spying.146 This section will examine each of these concerns in
turn.
conduct reconsideration proceedings and to consider objections to the rule raised by affected
industries).
142. Petition for Reconsideration and Stay for the Chemical Safety Advocacy Group, In
re Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 4595, No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 (E.A.D. filed
Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0766
(follow “View document:” hyperlink).
143. Christina Richards, When Communications Infrastructure Fails During a Disaster,
Disaster Recovery J. (Nov.12, 2015). For example, Superstorm Sandy knocked out
communications across the east coast. Jim McKay, Sandy Created a Black Hole of
Communication, Emergency Management (Jan. 28, 2013).
144. See, supra notes 74 & 76; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. OR2012-10821 (2012),
https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/openrecords/50abbott/orl/2012/htm/or20121
0821.htm; see also Edgar Walters, Transcript: Abbott’s Remarks on Hazardous Chemical
Storage, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/07/03
/abbott-pivots-access-information-about-chemicals/. The Bhopal, Institute, and West, Texas
chemical disasters were exacerbated by a dearth of information among plant employees, first
responders, and citizens near the disaster sites.
145. Thomas C. Beierle, The Benefits and Costs of Disclosing Information About Risks:
What Do We Know About Right To Know?, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 335, 336 (2004).
146. Id.
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Terrorism and National Security Risks

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there was a backlash to
information access provisions in environmental laws, and especially those
laws that required reports of hazardous chemical locations.147 Federal, state,
and local governments began to doubt the prudence of supplying public
access to information mapping out massive stores of dangerous chemicals.148
This fear was amplified as investigators gathered evidence that terrorists
may have relied on information downloaded from U.S. government sources
online to plan their attacks.149 The federal government restricted access to
federal records, tightening the language of FOIA to exempt records
whenever there was a “sound legal basis,”150 rather than the prior more
transparency-friendly standard of only exempting records that would cause
“foreseeable harm.”151 This change in language marked a shift from a default
of disclosure to one of secrecy.152
Provisions in environmental regulations were similarly reexamined
through a national security lens, and there was a push to restrict information
access by excluding certain data from public records and to allow federal
preemption of state transparency laws in certain instances.153 Legislators and
regulators focused on EPCRA and RMP provisions as prime targets for
restricting access. For instance, the RMP OCAs that modeled plumes of
airborne hazardous chemicals which could endanger the health and welfare
of more than one million people were seen as natural security risks.154 OCAs
had originally been conceived under broad disclosure goals to maximize

147. Trang T. Tran, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and
National Security: Restricting Public Access to Location Information of Hazardous
Chemicals, 8 ENVTL. L. 369, 370 (2002).
148. Id.
149. O’Reilly, supra note 84, at 55960.
150. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB
84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf (discussing FOIA).
151. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84
/Reno%20Memo.pdf (discussing FOIA); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03981, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW
ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2003), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-981.
152. A study followed agencies’ reactions to the Ashcroft FOIA memo, noting that some
agencies adopted significant changes to their FOIA practices, amending their FOIA practices,
and disclosing fewer records after the memo was issued. The Ashcroft Memo: “Drastic”
Change or “More Thunder Than Lightning”?, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Mar. 14, 2003),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/findingsag.htm.
153. Tran, supra note 146, at 369.
154. Beierle, supra note 144, at 338.
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disaster preparation and to reduce chemical hazard risk.155 However, in a
post-9/11 world, releasing information to the entire world on how to make
toxic plumes fan out over populous areas seemed even riskier than thwarting
disaster preparation as people were concerned OCAs might be a treasure
map for terrorism.156
Even before 9/11, there were concerns about internet availability of
worst-case scenario information.157 Responding to this concern, Congress
passed Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory
Relief Act (CSISSFRRA),158 a law that limited the release of OCA
information on the Internet.159 CSISSFRRA ensured that OCAs would only
be available in paper format in a very limited number of federal reading
rooms, severely curtailing access to the worst-case scenario disclosures.160
The federal government began labeling information that could assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction as classified and
shielded information about infrastructure from disclosure.161 Information
about industrial plant inspections, chemical production, and water supplies
quietly disappeared from public access websites,162 as did the online RMP
portal.163 Anything that the government feared could provide targeting
information for terrorists hoping to use chemical plants as weapons of mass
destruction went offline and out of access for most people.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 339.
157. LINCOLN CHAFEE, FUELS REGULATORY RELIEF ACT, S. REP. NO. 106-70 (1999)
(“Since the promulgation of the rule establishing the risk management program, the Federal
Government has sought a means to address concerns regarding the potential terrorist threat
posed by Internet access to off-site consequence analysis information collected under the
RMP. Because section 112(r)(7) requires that risk management plans be available to the
public, the EPA planned to post the information collected under this program on an Internet
web site. Due to concerns about how terrorists might use this information if it were available
on the Internet, the EPA revised that plan and has joined with the Department of Justice in
seeking to limit Internet access to the off-site consequence analysis information.”).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1999).
159. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL SAFETY INFORMATION, SITE SECURITY AND
FUELS REGULATORY RELIEF ACT: PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
(2000),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/
ocafactsheet.pdf.
160. Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L.
No. 10640, 113 Stat. 207 (1990).
161. Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), https://fas.org/sgp
/bush/wh031902.html (discussing actions to safeguard information regarding weapons of
mass destruction and other sensitive documents related to homeland security).
162. O’Reilly, supra note 84, at 569.
163. Beierle, supra note 144.
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Under CSISSFRRA, anyone wanting to view an OCA must travel to a
federal reading room.164 After presenting identification, the interested
individual is allowed to view a hard copy of the plan.165 To further limit
access to OCAs, the documents can neither be copied nor removed from the
reading room sites.166 These new OCA access requirements not only make it
harder for people to see OCAs, but they also prevent non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and the media, the main conduits of chemical risk
information, from sharing the chemical disaster information with the public.
These OCA limitations run counter to the purpose of the RMP program
to “inform members of the public and allow them to participate in decisions
that affect their lives and communities.”167 Further, an open OCA disclosure
model benefits public safety by reducing the number and severity of
accidental chemical releases.168 In the post-9/11 RMP scheme, people
without the time and ability to visit a reading room do not get the chemical
hazard information they need to make informed choices. Few people sought
out OCAs in federal reading rooms after CSISSFRRA.169 This may be
because there are so few reading roomsmost states only have one reading
room in the entire state. For instance, in New York, regardless of whether
one lives in Albany, Buffalo, or Syracuse, he or she must travel to the
reading room in Brooklyn, New York to view OCA materials.170 Because it
is so hard to get the reports, very few news organizations or NGOs report on
the chemical risks, and the lack of transparency reduced pressure on
industrial plants to increase safety.171
States made similar moves to limit access to chemical hazard materials.
In Texas, Attorney General Abbott’s decision to restrict access to EPCRA
Program 2 inventories in the wake of an explosion at the West Fertilizer
Company’s storage and distribution plant in West, Texas purportedly
stemmed from his fears about terrorism.172 Prior to this decision, Texas
made RMP and Program 2 inventories available to homeowners, the media,
164. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1999).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(H)(vii)(II); 40 C.F.R. § 1400.6; Security Notice, 65 Fed.
Reg. 48108, 48119 (Aug. 4, 2000).
166. Id.
167. Beierle, supra note 144, at 339.
168. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE INCENTIVES CREATED BY PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF OFF-SITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INFORMATION FOR REDUCTION IN THE RISK
OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES 2 (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-01
/documents/assessment_of_the_incentives_0.pdf.
169. Beierle, supra note 144, at 339.
170. Federal Reading Rooms for Risk Management Plans, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/rmp/federal-reading-rooms-risk-management-plans-rmp (last
visited Sept. 17, 2018).
171. Beierle, supra note 144, at 339.
172. Texas Attorney General, supra note 143.
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and anyone else who wanted to know where dangerous chemicals were
stored.173 Yet, in 2014, Abbott seized on the West Fertilizer Company
explosion to change that policy under the guise of promoting security.174
Never mind that the West Fertilizer Texas explosion was most likely due to
poor safety practices at the facility and not terrorism. 175 That fact did not
stop Attorney General Abbott from using the incident to achieve
information secrecy ends.176 Indeed, he invoked terrorism as a pretext for his
order allowing state agencies to withhold the information “because evildoers
could use it to gain access to the chemicals and terrorize communities.”177
Attorney General Abbott opined that any homeowners concerned that they
may live near stores of dangerous chemicals should “simply ask the
companies near their homes what substances are kept on site.”178 Attorney
General Abbott replaced a comprehensive plan for providing local
communities access to necessary information about chemical hazards with
something akin to a treasure hunt—tasking individual citizens with cobbling
together their own understanding of the risks created by industrial facilities
in their vicinity.179
Since the 2014 decree, people seeking RMP information in Texas have
gotten “mixed results” from asking individual companies for their Program
2 reports.180 Although the law still requires companies to produce RMPs
within ten days of a request, it is unclear whether the EPA enforces that
deadline.181 Conflicting statements from EPCRA administrators about access
173. Platoff & Malewitz, supra note 15.
174. Texas Attorney General, supra note 143.
175. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives investigations ruled out
terrorism, but questions remain about how the fire that caused the explosion started. The
investigations cited lack of community awareness and disaster preparedness as issues that led
to the explosion and its deadly aftermath. Dan Zak, After the Blast, WASH. POST (Oct. 10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/lifestyle/west-texas-after-theblast/?utm_term=.356d5f3cdfc2 (“West registered only briefly on the national radar.
Donations poured in and cable news crews camped for a while outside the cattle-auction
building, but it soon became clear that there was no link to terrorism.”).
176. Texas Attorney General, supra note 143.
177. Jay Root, Abbott: Ask Chemical Plants What’s Inside, TEX. TRIB. (July 1, 2014,
12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/07/01/abbott-ask-chemical-plants-whatsinside/.
178. Id. One Dallas news station decided to test Abbott’s proposal. They were
unceremoniously escorted from multiple properties and received none of the information they
requested. Editorial: Abbott Steps in It on Chemicals Issue, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July
2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2014/07/04/editorial-abbott-steps-init-on-chemicals-issue.
179. Root, supra note 176.
180. Lauren McGaughy, Abbott Says Companies Must Release Chemical Info but State
Does Not, HOUS. CHRON. (July 2, 2014, 10:13 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news
/politics/texas/article/Abbott-says-companies-must-release-chemical-info-5596872.php.
181. Id.
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to hazard information sow confusion in local offices that provide EPCRA
records to the public. For example, even though Attorney General Abbott’s
office eventually walked back its instructions to withhold Program 2 reports
from the public, LEPC chairs such as Harold Lovejoy in Bexar County
continued to withhold the records, believing that Program 2 submissions are
confidential despite the federal law’s explicit disclosure requirements.182
The 2000 CSSISFRA overview states: “Chemical accidents take a
significant toll on life, property, and the environment each year. However, a
single, successful terrorist attack on a chemical facility could take a greater
toll than would many accidental chemical releases.”183
Almost two decades later, the federal government should reconsider
national security concerns and instead weigh natural disaster concerns
against the failure to disseminate chemical hazard information to the public
as climate change promises to bring even more punishing weather to U.S.
localities. While national security is a legitimate rationale for withholding
certain types of government records, the government should also recognize
that failing to inform the public about chemical hazards can be life
threatening, especially in extreme weather events. Restricting access to
chemical storage data creates its own safety risks, and it can be a matter of
life or death for citizens in a hurricane’s path.184
2.

Safeguarding Corporate Information from Competitive Use

Along with national security fears, people worry that industry
competitors might take advantage of chemical data by stealing chemical
recipes for their own corporate gain.185 Indeed, the “secret recipes” of
chemical compositions are quite valuable, and so are details about how
competitors run their industrial plants. That kind of information can be
worth top dollar in competitive industrial fields, and federal, state, and local
governments often restrict transparency provisions to protect industrial and
commercial interests and to entice industries to develop in its jurisdiction.
The protection of chemical information is especially pervasive in the
hydraulic fracturing industry, where states thwart traditional transparency
laws to protect fracking fluid formulae.186 While many states require
fracking companies to disclose the contents of fracking fluids used in wells
within their borders to state regulators, all states exempt proprietary
information, or information considered by the mining companies to be
182. Id.
183. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 158.
184. Platoff & Malewitz, supra note 15.
185. Id.
186. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 400 (2013).
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“trade secrets” from public disclosure requirements.187 Across the country,
when fracking chemicals are labeled trade secret, information about them
becomes unavailable to the public, including first responders and emergency
workers.188 Some states go even further, exempting trade secret-labeled
fracking fluids not only from public disclosure but also from disclosure to
regulators. In Texas, Louisiana, and Colorado, the agencies charged with
protecting human health and welfare have no idea what fracking fluids
contain.189 Pennsylvania requires that fracking companies turn over this
information to health professionals who request the information to treat a
patient exposed to the chemicals.190 However, until recently, Pennsylvania
law also required doctors using this provision to sign a confidentiality
agreement that prevented any disclosure of the information—even to the
exposed patient.191 After years of litigation,192 a plurality of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court finally found those confidentiality agreements
unconstitutional, along with many other secrecy provisions in
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Law.193
While protecting proprietary information is important, the industry has
used trade secret claims to avoid disclosing vital public health information.
There is ample evidence that fracking fluids are contaminating drinking
water.194 This contamination creates an urgent public need to know the
composition of those fluids. The industry should not have the power to deny
access to that information under the guise of trade secrets.

187. Id. at 411.
188. Id. at 411–16.
189. Id.; see, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2018); LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118(C)(2) (2018); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(d)(4) (2018).
190. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(11) (West 2018).
191. Kate Sheppard, For Pennsylvania’s Doctors, a Gag Order on Fracking Chemicals,
MOTHER JONES (Mar. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/environment
/2012/03/fracking-doctors-gag-pennsylvania/.
192. Doctors Fight “Gag Orders” over Fracking Chemicals, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 27,
2012),
http://www.amednews.com/article/20120827/government/308279957/1/;
Susan
Phillips, Leading Public Health Official Says Impact Fee Law Violates Medical Ethics, ST.
IMPACT PA. (Feb. 16, 2012, 12:02 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/Pennsylvania/2012/02
/16/leading-public-health-official-says-impact-fee-law-violates-medical-ethics/.
193. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 910 (2013) (plurality
opinion); see also Sam Stecklow, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overturns Doctor Gag Order
on Disclosing Fracking Information, SPLINTER (Oct. 2, 2016, 1:33 PM), https://
splinternews.com/pennsylvania-supreme-court-overturns-doctor-gag-order-o-1793862362.
194. TINA FORRESTER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CONSULTATION
REPORTS: DIMOCK GROUNDWATER SITE (2016), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha
/DimockGroundwaterSite/Dimock_Groundwater_Site_HC_05-24-2016_508.pdf.
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Political and Practical Obstacles to Information Access

Beyond regulatory barriers designed to prevent unintended use,
procedural obstacles also make chemical data inaccessible. One major
practical issue is administrative failure to update information access laws.195
The RMP needs some information access improvements.196 Even after the
RMP’s implementation, regulated entities were the site of more than 1,500
reportable accidents, and approximately 500 of those accidents had off-site
impacts. RMP facility accidents have killed 60 people, injured
approximately 17,000 more, and forced evacuations or shelter-in-place
orders affecting approximately 500,000 others and costing more than $2
billion.197
After the West Fertilizer Company explosion in 2016, President Obama
issued an Executive Order to improve the RMP.198 The Order sought to
improve operational coordination with states, tribes, and local partners, to
enhance agency coordination and information sharing, to modernize policies
and guidance, and to identify best practices for preventing chemical release
disasters.199 The EPA proposed changes to the RMP rule in 2016,200 and it
published a final rule on January 13, 2017, mere days before the Trump
administration entered their executive offices.201 The new rule would have
modernized and improved the RMP program, requiring additional
information collection and increasing access to chemical hazard
information.202 Before any of these improvements to the RMP were

195. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 24853 (proposed May 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 13641 (proposed Mar. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
68).
196. Id.
197. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ACTIVITIES UNDER EO 13650: PROPOSED CHANGES
TO THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (RMP) RULE QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 2 (2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/rmp_proposed
_rule_qs_and_as_2-26-16_removed_pub_number_fixed_date.pdf.
198. Exec. Order No. 13650, 78 Fed. Reg. 48029 (Aug. 1, 2013).
199. Id.
200. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 13638 (proposed Mar. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68); see also Final Amendments to the Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/rmp/final-amendments-risk-managementprogram-rmp-rule (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (containing full list of activities).
201. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (proposed Mar. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68).
202. Id.
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implemented, the new administration withdrew the final rule203 in response
to a petition filed by the so-called “RMP Coalition,” a group of industry
corporations including the American Petroleum Institute and the American
Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers.204 Ironically, the petitioners that
killed the new RMP rule included both the state of Texas205 and Arkema.206
Lax enforcement also prevents public access to accurate disaster
preparation information. For example, companies cut and paste information
from one reporting form into other forms, without regard to relevance.207
These companies are banking on regulators not reading the documents—
converting a substantive process into merely a series of hoops to jump
through.208 The most famous such example was BP’s oil spill response plan
for the drilling operation in the Gulf of Mexico.209 After the Deepwater
Horizon disaster dumped more than 200 million gallons of crude oil into the
Gulf of Mexico, it became clear that BP’s spill action plan was chock full of
data it had copied and pasted from a plan designed for another project.210 For
example, BP’s Gulf of Mexico planning form listed walruses, sea otters, sea
lions and seals as the “sensitive biological resources” at risk in the event of
an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, even though none of those animals live in
the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem.211 Despite this obvious misinformation, the

203. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 16146 (proposed Apr. 3, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 68).
204. Petition for Reconsideration and Stay for the RMP Coalition, In re Accidental
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act,
Final Rule 82 Fed. Reg. 4594, No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 (E.A.D. filed Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-03/documents/rpm_coalition__cover_letter_and_petition_for_reconsideration_and_stay_508_3-13-17.pdf.
205. Petition for Reconsideration and Stay for the States of Louisiana et al., In re
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: A Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, Final Rule 82 Fed. Reg. 4594, No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 (E.A.D. filed
Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0762
(follow “View document:” hyperlink).
206. Comment Letter for Arkema, In re Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: A
Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Final Rule 82 Fed. Reg. 4594, No.
EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725 (E.A.D. filed May 13, 2016), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0526 (follow “View attachment:” hyperlink).
207. Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wakeup Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater
Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7 (2011).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. See also, Alyson Flournoy, et al., Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures
Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence 1618 (2010)
211. Id.
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plan was approved and was the only resource available to the public and
first responders as a reliable source of emergency response information.212
EPCRA and RMP rules are also under-enforced by SERCs and LEPCs.
These state and local entities often lack the resources and staff to monitor
industry reporting practices or file lawsuits when regulated entities fail to
properly report their data.213 SERC and LEPC programs lack uniformity as
each state and locality has its own financial and staffing limitations.214 The
limitations of local enforcement are clear: on a local level, studies show that
LEPCs often fail to provide public notice about their activities and meetings,
and they do not receive public inquiries, as most of the public does not even
know that LEPCs exist.215 There is often little or no LEPC oversight, as
LEPC compliance is usually enforced through citizen suits, placing the onus
on monitoring and ensuring public access to chemical data on the public
itself.216 The citizen suit model for ensuring that LEPCs are doing their jobs
is especially ineffective in natural disasters, where weather forecasts do not
give people facing catastrophic weather enough time for filing lawsuits to
get data from LEPCs.
Even when an LEPC is operating at its best, chemical hazard data is
difficult to access. For one, LEPCs provide paper records in physical
reading rooms, with little or no online availability.217 Reading rooms can
212. THE RESPONSE GROUP, BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN
(2009), http://housedocs.house.gov/energycommerce/Docs_06152010/BP.Oil.Spill.Response
.Plan.pdf.
213. Purifoy, supra note 122, at 418 (“[LEPCs] vast responsibilities are immensely
under-supported by the state and federal governments, reducing community incentive to
invest precious time and personal resources in an arduous task . . . “); Rebecca S. Weeks, The
Bumpy Road to Community Preparedness: The Emergency Planning and Community Rightto-Know Act, 4 ENVTL. L. 827, 858 (1998) (citing insufficient funding as an issue in SERCs
and LEPCs). A 2008 EPA survey of LEPCs found that lack of funding and consistent
membership are obstacles to success. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEES FINAL REPORT
(2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents/2008_lepcsurv.pdf.
214. See, e.g., OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., supra note 212, at 15 (describing the vast
differences among various LEPC operations, which are affected by factors including funding,
access to technology, leadership, population, and prior exposure to chemical disaster).
215. See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 212, at 879; Joe Partridge, “We Don’t Do That
Here”The Failure to Implement the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act in OregonPart 3, LINKEDIN (June 25, 2014) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse
/20140625142702-37985903--we-don-t-do-that-here-the-failure-to-implement-theemergency-planning-and-community-right-to-know-act-in-oregon-part-3/.
216. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996); Trepanier v.
Ryan, No. 00 C 2393, 2003 WL 21209832 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2003).
217. In 2008, less than one-quarter (23.6%) of LEPCs that responded to the EPA’s survey
had a website. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., supra note 212, at 15. There is little incentive
to create an online presence for LEPCs, and even less incentive to do the intensive work
required to build an online records archive LEPCs are not legally required to have online
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often only be visited by appointment, during business hours.218 Although
Program 2 EPCRA inventories must be provided to LEPCs within ten days
of a formal request, there are no clear penalties for companies that refuse
these requests.219 While delayed access to information may be less of an
issue for general awareness in low-danger situations, such an approach is
wholly insufficient for preparing people who are facing natural disasters.
State and local recordkeeping are also inefficient, because data centers
similar to LEPCs are under-resourced. Even the federal government is
stretched thin in managing large information collections.220 States and
localities, with significantly fewer resources, struggle to maintain the
necessary records.221 Further, state agency recordkeeping practices tend to
be rather slipshod. State environmental records are often incomplete, and
when states reorganize their files, people may no longer be able to access
them.222 Lack of staff, technology, and funding can leave LEPCs with little
ability to create a truly accessible collection of records, and in 2019, online
access remains a distant hope.223 Instead, of easily accessible digital formats,
paper copies of information are stored on dusty filing shelves.224 Even states
that manage to publish chemical hazard data online cannot afford highquality database systems. For example, Massachusetts and New Jersey
adopted online systems that made it hard for people to use the underlying
data.225
Finally, chemical hazard information is often difficult for laypersons to
understand. Most first responders and community members are not chemists
or science experts, so the jargon and formulae of chemical hazard reports are

archives, and most are underfunded and understaffed. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
supra note 122.
218. Id.
219. Platoff & Malewitz, supra note 15.
220. The National Archives, the central entity for processing government records and
overseeing agency records management, is chronically understaffed and underfunded. See
Richard Immerman et al., A National Treasure at the Brink: Survey Highlights Historians’
Love of, and Frustration With, the National Archives, PERSP. ON HIST. (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/april-2014/anational-treasure-at-the-brink.
221. Without online archives, and with only a volunteer staff of local first responders and
officials, LEPCs lack the resources to create optimal archiving and access systems for their
records.
222. Barry Boyer & D. Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 833, 918 (1985).
223. Id.
224. Immerman et al., supra note 219.
225. Beierle, supra note 144, at 341.
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difficult to interpret.226 EPCRA’s TRI can seem like an impenetrable data
dump to a layperson. Similarly, RMP plans need to be interpreted by science
experts. In the short span of time between natural disaster warnings and
natural disasters striking, first responders and the public need informational
materials that are streamlined and easy to digest.227 For this reason, we
propose a new framework for risk disclosure, one based on a model that has
already been proven effective in another contextFDA’s product labeling
system.
V. ADAPTING FDA’S FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSMITTING RISK INFORMATION
The FDA’s successful methods for explaining and communicating
about risks to the public can inform solutions to problems with chemical
hazard information access. Effective disaster preparation and reaction
usually requires quick thinking and streamlined processes. People must
know three basic things: (1) whether there is a danger, (2) what the danger
is, and (3) how best to prepare for it. Is there a chance that a nearby plant
will release a toxic plume into the air? Is the plume going to be filled with
toxins that will hurt people’s throats or eyes? Is there a danger that the
emission may ignite or cause an explosion? These types of information
should be clearly and efficiently communicated to people at risk.
The FDA has successfully employed an effective risk communication
system, providing plain language circulars and messages to consumers about
medication risks.228 The FDA’s solution for transmitting risk information to
the public can be found in labeling laws and FDA regulations.229 Our
proposed model offers a simple, accessible way to reach the public, and it
preserves the balance of providing information access while safeguarding
information from unintended uses.

226. One compilation of chemical disaster preparedness materials explains that “[t]he
RMPs are typically full of the technical jargon” including regulatory terminology RQ
(reportable quantity) and scientific chemical names and compounds. U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION DOCUMENTS 108 (2015),
https://deq.mt.gov/Portals/112/DEQAdmin/DIR/Documents/EPCRA/Chemical%20Emergenc
y%20Preparedness%20and%20Prevention%20Documents%20--%20Compilation.pdf.
227. OFFICE OF THE SCI. ADVISOR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EVALUATING THE TOXICITY OF
CHEMICALS (2009), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1003351.PDF?Dockey=P1003351
.PDF.
228. See, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
COMMUNICATING RISKS AND BENEFITS: AN EVIDENCE-BASED USER’S GUIDE (Baruch
Fischhoff et al. eds., 2011), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals
Forms/Reports/UCM268069.pdf.
229. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2018).
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FDA labeling and packaging provides just enough accurate information
to help people make sound choices.230 The labeling laws require package
inserts, direction circulars, and package circulars that list potential risks and
side effects.231 The laws provide relevant warnings, specifying what could
occur when using the medication and what to do when a negative side effect
occurs.232 These labeling requirements are designed not for consumers, but
to help healthcare practitioners easily find, read, and convey information
important for the safe and effective use of prescription drugs.233 The result,
however, is more useful, easy to understand information for both consumers
and professionals.
The information in FDA circulars need not be complex nor technical,
in fact, streamlined summaries highlight the important details necessary to
ensure that healthcare professionals and the public understand drug risks.234
The disclosures necessary for effective natural disaster safety are not indepth or technical. They need not reveal information at the heart of the
unintended use concerns; people do not need to know precise trade secret
chemical “recipes,” nor do they need the precise address or location
descriptors directing people to the chemicals themselves. Rather, citizens
simply need to know what the risks are and whether they are in a location
that is at risk.
Streamlined, plain language communication would help people prepare
for chemical disasters. In fact, EPCRA already requires facilities to submit
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard required material safety data sheets
(MSDS), which are similar to FDA circulars, to SERCs, LEPCs, and local
fire departments.235 MSDS provide data on the health and physical hazards
of chemicals and list protective measures.236 Adopting an FDA model could
help disseminate the information in the MSDS beyond workplaces, to the
public, in an efficient, easy-to-access manner.
Further, experience shows that local laws providing chemical disaster
information to the public do not inevitably create a slippery slope to

230.
231.
232.
233.

See COMMUNICATING RISKS AND BENEFITS, supra note 227.
21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1) (2018).
Id.
The FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information Format, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
LawsActsandRules/ucm188665.htm (last updated Dec. 4, 2015) (describing how the labeling
scheme is intended to help health care professionals have immediate access to up-to-date
drug information).
234. Renu Lal & Mary Kremzer, Introduction to the New Prescription Drug Labeling by
the Food and Drug Administration, 64 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2488 (2007).
235. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, §
311 (a)(1), 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
236. Id. at § 311(a)(2).
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unintended use.237 Some state laws provide limited chemical information to
promote safe mining and community preparedness in case of a chemical
disaster. For example, in Louisiana, fracking companies must identify the
trade name and supplier of fracking fluid additives, as well as the function
or purpose of the fluid “such as acid, biocide, breaker, corrosion inhibitor”
without providing the specific formulae for fracking fluids.238 There are
ways to balance the benefits of disclosure with the risks of unintended use
by providing “information that is of little use to those seeking to do harm
while at the same time useful to a public concerned about risks.”239 One
benefit of narrower disclosure is that these less-specific chemical disclosures
simplify disclosure for regulated entities, making disclosure less
burdensome.240
FDA-styled disclosures would certainly have helped the community
surrounding the Arkema plant. If Arkema had disseminated circulars letting
people know that its plant contained chemicals that would combust if the
refrigeration system failed, and had supplied information about how to
prevent injuries from chemical plumes, then first responders would have
been adequately prepared for the risks. Because no such requirements
existed, Arkema’s CEO refused to describe the substances that would be
released when the plant exploded, leaving one exasperated reporter to write,
“[t]hey could be hoarding nerve gas in that place, and be perfectly within the
law not to tell anybody about it.”241 This level of corporate secrecy thwarts
the “community right to know” enshrined in federal law and makes
comprehensive emergency planning impossible.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change makes natural disasters more likely and more intense.
New weather trends require communities to be ready for chemical disasters
caused by flood waters, high winds, fires, mudslides, and other weather
events. The information access infrastructure is critical for effective disaster
response and hazard management. Disaster response collaboration is an
unpredictable, dynamic, and complex interplay between multiple groups of
professionals and stakeholders in the best of cases.242 Arming the public and
first responders with information about potential chemical hazards will
237. Id.
238. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 C.1(b) (2017).
239. Beierle, supra note 144, at 344.
240. Hall, supra note 185, at 420–21.
241. Charles P. Pierce, The Chemical Plant Explosion in Texas Is Not an Accident. It’s
the Result of Specific Choices, ESQUIRE (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.esquire.com/newspolitics/politics/news/a57290/texas-deregulation-harvey-chemical-plants/.
242. Bharosa et al., supra note 27, at 49.
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improve disaster response communication and organization. If first
responders know that an industrial plant is likely to explode, they can plan
for the explosion and its risks, and even try to prevent it. Instead, the
Arkema first responders find themselves suing to recover for the injuries
they suffered because the plant failed to disclose chemical data.243
Optimal risk communication requires broad information disclosure to
people directly impacted by risk, and also to NGOs and media that may
communicate the risk to communities.244 State officials, including Greg
Abbott, whose information infrastructure plans center around driving around
and asking facilities “whether or not they have chemicals”245 fail to keep the
public safe in natural disaster situations. As extreme weather increases,
proactive, streamlined, and wide-ranging information distribution is
necessary to ensure that first responders and communities are prepared for
potential chemical disasters. Adopting the FDA’s disclosure model will
achieve both of those goals: improving emergency response and arming the
public with the knowledge they need to take appropriate precautions in the
face of this growing threat.

243. The first lawsuit was filed in early September. Pls.’ Orig. Pet. and Appl. for TRO
and Temp. Inj. and Req. for Disclosure, Graves v. Arkema Inc., No. 4:17-cv-03068 (Tex.
S.D. Ct. Sept. 7, 2017). By 2018, there were multiple lawsuits with hundreds of plaintiffs.
Platoff, supra note 131.
244. Beierle, supra note 144, at 342–45.
245. Platoff & Malewitz, supra note 15.

